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PROLIFERATION DIGEST (U)



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*Special Issue on the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty*

November 1994

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Abbreviations for compartmented code words are:
M—MORAY S—SPOKE U—UMBRA
R—RUFF Z—ZARE G—GAMMA

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Proliferation Digest (U)*Special Issue on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty*

November 1994

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A consensus in favor of indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is unlikely, but a simple majority vote for indefinite extension—as required by the Treaty—seems achievable. The situation is still fluid, however, and momentum—partly fed by perceptions that the United States and the West are not firm in their support for indefinite extension—appears to be growing in favor of a fixed-term extension option. Some countries, now considered to be firm supporters for indefinite extension, would prefer acceptance of a long-term fixed extension by consensus over an indefinite extension by a narrow majority.

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
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Perspective**The Politics of NPT Extension: Countdown to the 1995 Conference**

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A consensus in favor of indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is unlikely, but a simple majority vote for indefinite extension—as required by the Treaty—seems achievable. The situation is still fluid, however, and momentum—partly fed by perceptions that the United States and the West are not firm in their support for indefinite extension—appears to be growing in favor of a fixed-term extension option. Some countries, now considered to be firm supporters for indefinite extension, would prefer acceptance of a long-term fixed extension by consensus over an indefinite extension by a narrow majority.

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Roadblocks to Indefinite Extension

The April 1995 extension conference gives Treaty signatories the opportunity to voice grievances that have evolved since the NPT entered into force in 1970. The debate over NPT extension sharply underscores longstanding and widespread disillusionment with the perceived failure of the nuclear-weapon states to live up to their NPT Article VI obligations to pursue nuclear disarmament. Moreover, the non-nuclear-weapon states question whether the NPT is consistent with their future security needs, pointing to regional disputes, nuclear theft, the continued nuclear threat from both the declared and nonsignatory “threshold” nuclear-weapon states, and the NPT’s unsatisfactory mechanism for ensuring compliance.

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The 1995 NPT Conference provides the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) with an opportunity to challenge the global nuclear status quo and reassert itself as a viable force. With 95 votes, NAM countries could have a substantial impact on the outcome of the NPT Conference. At the third Preparatory Committee (Prepcom) meeting in September 1994, NAM opponents of indefinite extension crafted a document outlining their concerns.

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The NAM’s primary NPT grievances are:

- *Perceived poor performance by the nuclear-weapon states in negotiating in “good faith” toward complete nuclear disarmament (Article VI). Significant progress toward the conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is arguably the single most important measure that would widen the margin of support for indefinite extension of the NPT. Mexico, for example, has long criticized the nuclear-weapon states for failing to negotiate a CTBT. Chances for obtaining a CTBT before the extension conference are virtually nil.*

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In October 1994, the Sri Lankan President of the 1995 NPT Conference

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said publicly that acceptance by all parties of 1996 as a target date for completing the CTBT might be a credible step but the optimal outcome would be to adopt a CTBT in 1995.

- *Failure of the NPT to provide legally binding security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon states.* The existence of declared and "threshold" nuclear-weapon states, the emerging nuclear smuggling threat, and regional conflicts have increased longstanding concerns about the need for legally binding—or at least greatly strengthened—security assurances. At the third Prepcom, Egypt proposed a protocol that would incorporate security assurances into the NPT. Some African, Latin American, and South Pacific countries view the adherence of the nuclear-weapon states to existing and proposed nuclear-weapon-free zones as a model of a legally binding security assurance. Protocol II of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty commits the nuclear-weapon states not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against parties to the SPNFZ Treaty (only Russia and China have signed this Protocol). Similarly, Article 3 of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco stipulates that all contracting parties will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, albeit with some provisos. All declared nuclear-weapon states have signed that protocol. Obtaining the support of the nuclear-weapon states for a similar protocol in the draft Africa Nuclear Weapons Free Zone is a key goal of some African states.
- *Inability of the international community to ensure universal adherence to the NPT.* This criticism is partly a response to Israel's unwillingness to join the NPT. [redacted] indefinite extension would be unacceptable to Arab states without some unequivocal movement by Israel to accede to the NPT. Although primarily an Arab security concern, this issue also resonates among other developing countries. Ukraine's ambiguous nuclear status also is a concern of some countries, which note the continued existence of nuclear weapons in Ukraine despite Kiev's stated commitment to return these weapons to Russia and accede to the NPT. Some treaty critics also note the failure of the NPT to gain Pakistan's and India's accession.
- *Discriminatory nuclear technical assistance and export control practices.* A vocal group of developing countries—including Iran and Egypt—has accused the nuclear suppliers of not living up to the obligations of Article IV of the NPT to provide nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. These countries are suspicious of efforts by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to further restrict nuclear or dual-use commodity trade. China, which derives substantial income from nuclear-related exports, also is concerned about efforts to strengthen nuclear-related export controls.

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- *Shortfalls in the NPT's inspection, verification, and compliance mechanisms.* Revelations that Iraq developed a covert nuclear weapons program while under IAEA safeguards and the IAEA's difficulty in obtaining access to nuclear-related sites in North Korea have generated complaints about the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. Some countries have argued that NPT verification mechanisms should be strengthened. Most developing countries do not support this position, in part because of concerns that a strengthened safeguards regime could represent further intrusions on their national sovereignty. [REDACTED]

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Regional Alliances and the NPT Vote Count

The alliances and voting blocs emerging during the preparatory phase of the NPT extension process reflect to some extent a trend toward regionalism in post-Cold War international politics (see Proliferation Snapshot page 45). For example, the NAM, which once would have provided a somewhat cohesive front, is now dividing its vote along broad regional lines. The 95 NAM votes will depend on several factors, including conference dynamics, US and allied influence, possible offers of economic concessions, regional security considerations, and the position of neighboring countries and mentor states. [REDACTED]

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Europe and Eurasia (48 votes). The core proponents of indefinite extension are in Europe and Eurasia: The majority of this group—which includes the United Kingdom, Russia, and France—are currently considered firm supporters. Thirteen countries of the former Soviet Union are NPT signatories, and most are likely to support the West's position. Ukraine's legislature recently approved NPT accession with conditions, and Tajikistan, the only other remaining nonsignatory country, may accede prior to the extension conference. [REDACTED]

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Latin America (29 votes). Most Latin American countries are undecided or leaning toward supporting indefinite extension. The Organization of American States (OAS) includes 12 Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) members that expressed general support for indefinite extension earlier this year. Five OAS signatories—Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Uruguay—have publicly linked their NPT extension decision to progress toward nuclear disarmament. Mexico might eventually support the US position, but Colombia and Venezuela back a 25-year fixed-term extension. Colombia, which will assume the NAM presidency from Indonesia in January 1995, will be in a position to influence wavering Latin American countries. [REDACTED]

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The South Pacific (10 votes). The South Pacific Forum (SPF) includes several firm supporters of indefinite extension, such as Australia and New Zealand. After its July/August 1994 conference, the SPF issued a communi-

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Future NPT Leadership

NPT Preparatory Committee (Prepcom) chairmen and Conference presidents often have had political views that have shaped the outcomes of the Prepcom or Conference. Because these positions are considered to be significant variables in the outcome of NPT meetings, they are coveted by the various voting blocs and are often rotated along geographic and political lines. The scheduled chairman for the January 1995 Fourth Prepcom comes from Nigeria (a country opposed to NPT indefinite extension), and the president of the April NPT Extension Conference represents Sri Lanka (leaning toward indefinite extension). [redacted]

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Leadership positions in NPT conferences are typically determined by a consensus of signatories, but because the third Prepcom meeting last September failed to reach consensus, the fourth Prepcom—which will be held from 23 to 27 January 1995—will be led by the chairman of the third Prepcom meeting, Isaac Ayewah. Unless a consensus can be reached for a new chairman early during the next Prepcom, which appears unlikely, Isaac Ayewah will remain the chairman for the entire fourth Prepcom meeting. [redacted]

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que that included a statement supporting indefinite extension of the NPT. The SPF nonetheless wants all the nuclear-weapon states to sign Protocol II of the SPNFZ Treaty. [redacted]

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The Middle East and South Asia (23 votes). There is no firm support for indefinite extension in this region. Ten of the 16 Arab NPT signatories generally oppose indefinite extension, and Iran is focusing its vociferous opposition largely on the alleged discriminatory export control practices of the West. The Arab League has not declared an official position on NPT

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extension, but several influential Arab states are trying to convince others to make their acceptance of indefinite extension dependent on Israeli movement toward accession to the NPT. Some Arab states—such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Morocco—say they would like to support indefinite extension but would come under strong pressure to support an Arab League position if one emerges. No consensus has emerged among India's and Pakistan's six nonnuclear neighbors—Afghanistan,

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Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.¹ Sri Lankan Additional Foreign Secretary Jayantha Dhanapala is the President-designate of the 1995 NPT Conference.

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East Asia (15 Votes). Only South Korea and Japan are firm supporters of indefinite extension. Burma and North Korea are opposed, and most of the six member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have expressed some opposition to indefinite extension. ASEAN, at its July 1994 Ministerial, signaled a reluctance to extend the Treaty indefinitely without movement on disarmament issues. Thailand's Deputy Foreign Minister has publicly stated that Thailand and the other ASEAN countries might support a 25-year fixed-term extension. Indonesia, as an ASEAN member and president of the NAM, may wield significant influence over undecided NAM countries. China remains uncommitted on the term for extension and appears to be waiting to align itself with a NAM consensus if one emerges. China, however, opposes the NAM's call for completion of a CTBT prior to 1996.

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Africa (41 votes). African countries represent the largest undecided voting bloc, and many states will be seeking political and perhaps economic rewards for their votes. No Organization for African Unity (OAU) position has emerged, but the position of South Africa—now undecided—is likely to be influential, as is that of Egypt. So far, 15 African states have expressed some support for indefinite extension; they include countries—such as the former French colonies of Cameroon, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, and Gabon—where the West has significant influence. Besides some African states also in the Arab League, only Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zambia have expressed outright opposition to indefinite extension, favoring a more limited extension pending progress on nuclear disarmament.²

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Outlook

Country positions on extending the NPT remain highly fluid, and there have been dozens of shifts in country positions in recent months. Some signatories will wait until shortly before the extension conference to determine their final position.

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A substantial, high-level diplomatic effort by the United States and its allies will probably be required to obtain a majority vote for indefinite extension—although not all states are susceptible to such pressure. To obtain a substantial majority, perhaps two-thirds or more, significant progress will be required on arms control measures such as the CTBT, and Israel would have to signal that it plans to adhere eventually to the NPT.

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¹ Afghanistan and the Maldives support unconditional extension. Bangladesh supports extension but is undecided as to which form. Nepal supports extension for 20 years. Sri Lanka will support whatever consensus emerges. Bhutan's views are unknown.

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² The seven African states in the Arab League—Tunisia, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, Libya, Egypt, and Morocco—were numerically counted in the Middle East And South Asia grouping.

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Possible Conference Outcomes

The Treaty text allows for the NPT to be extended indefinitely, or for a fixed period or periods. Because obtaining a slim majority vote for indefinite extension could undermine international confidence in the nuclear nonproliferation regime and cause some signatories to bolt the Treaty, many countries believe that they cannot support an extension option that does not attain a near consensus. Several options have been proposed:

- *Rolling Extension. Extend the NPT by additional fixed 25-year periods that would be renewed automatically unless the signatories acted to revoke the Treaty at the end of any period by majority decision. This option would, in practice, be roughly equivalent to indefinite extension.*
- *The Venezuelan Proposal. Extend the Treaty for an additional 25 years, at which point another extension conference would be called. Most Western countries see this option as requiring a Treaty amendment.*
- *Other Limited-Term Options. One time only, fixed terms of extension for as little as five years to gauge nuclear-weapon state progress on disarmament—and other—issues.*
- *Recessing or adjourning the extension conference for six months or more if an extension decision cannot be reached. Some nonaligned signatories may pursue this option to allow time to assess progress on negotiating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).*

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Perceptions that the United States and the West are not firm in their position also could decrease the likelihood of assembling a majority vote prior to the Conference:

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Sensitive to this perceived backsliding, opponents of indefinite extension are solidifying their positions and campaigning for regional and NAM support. Several countries, including Colombia and Indonesia, are rallying around a 25-year fixed-term option (see inset). Backers of indefinite extension may well be faced with choosing between supporting a narrow majority for indefinite extension or a large majority or near-consensus for a fixed-term extension option.

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